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It might be suggested that in auditory experience elements of the
material world are not apparent to us in the way they are in vision
and touch, and that this constitutes a shortcoming in the kind of
cognitive contact with the world provided by auditory perception.
I develop this suggestion, and then set out a way of thinking about
the appearances of sound-producing events that might provide a
response.1
We hear sounds. Many of the sounds we hear are produced by
things happening in the world around us. Hearing the sounds
produced by things happening often puts us in a position
to recognise those things. The following are some mundane
examples:
a bottle being uncorked
a match being struck and igniting
someone screwing up a sheet of paper into a ball
the opening of a Zippo lighter
a cigarette lighter being lit
winding an old clock
zipping up a zip
These are examples of different kinds of sound-producing event.
If you were to hear the sound made by one of these events, the
chances are that you would be able to recognise what kind of
event it was.
In the first half of this paper I ask how we recognise these
events, and whether our capacity to do so exploits the same kind
of cognitive contact with the material world that is provided by
vision and touch. For as long as we are not subject to illusion or
other sensory malfunction it is possible to acquire knowledge of
the material world solely on the basis of vision or touch. There is
1 Thanks to James Stazicker for very helpful comments and suggestions.
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a worry that the same is not true of auditory perception. At best,
it might be said, auditory perception grounds knowledge of
sounds; knowledge of the world depends on non-auditory knowl-
edge of the contingent connection between sounds and what
produces them. I begin by setting out this line of thought in more
detail, and outlining a response to it. I then suggest that there is
a second kind of worry: that elements of the material world are
not apparent to us in auditory experience in the way they are in
visual and tactile experience, and that this constitutes a short-
coming in the kind of cognitive contact with the world provided
by auditory experience. Finally, I set out a way of thinking about
our perception of sound-producing events that might provide a
way to respond to this worry.
Sounds are the sensory objects of our auditory experience, in
the following sense. Sounds are things that we can pick out and
attend to in auditory experience, and they are what determine the
conscious character of auditory experience: they are auditory
objects of awareness. Sameness and difference in auditory experi-
ences is a matter of sameness and difference in the sounds the
experiences are of. There are no objects of auditory experience
other than sounds whose presence can make a difference to the
conscious character of auditory experiences. It may be that two
auditory experiences can differ in their conscious character
without any difference in the sounds they are of but, if so, such a
difference is due to the character of auditory experiences as such,
and not to the presence or absence amongst the objects of experi-
ence of something other than the sounds. Given this, how things
appear to us in auditory experience is determined by how sounds
appear to us in auditory experience. How sounds appear is a
matter of what acoustic properties they instantiate – properties
such as pitch, timbre, and loudness – and the way those properties
change over time. Sounds appear the same or different to one
another in virtue of their instantiation of acoustic properties.
We sometimes talk of the auditory appearance of sound-
producing events. We might describe the uncorking of a bottle or
the striking of a match as sounding a certain way, analogously to
the way we might describe the bottle or the match as looking a
certain way. When we say that the bottle looks a certain way – that
it looks green, say – we are characterising the bottle, and the truth
of what we say is determined by how things are with the bottle. It
would be a mistake to conclude that when we describe the striking
of a match as sounding some way we are directly characterising
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the sound-producing event – the striking – rather than character-
izing the event in terms of something distinct from it, viz., the
sound it produces. We can explain what we mean when we say that
the uncorking sounds some way in terms of the sound it produces:
in many cases, to say that the uncorking sounded F is just to say
that it produced an F sound (a sound with an F appearance). In
saying how the event sounds we are characterising it indirectly on
the basis of the sound it produces. It does no harm to talk about
the auditory appearance of sound-producing events so long as we
remember that what we say is made true by the appearance of the
sound produced by that event.
Recognising events of the kind I began by describing depends
on our having a capacity to group certain sounds together as
saliently similar. The sounds made by different kinds of events
have a distinctive appearance in common, and in acquiring the
capacity to recognise a particular kind of event we learn that the
distinctive appearance is that of a sound produced by that kind of
event. We might gloss this by saying that we acquire the capacity to
recognise the auditory appearance of that kind of sound-
producing event.
The possibility of acquiring such a capacity depends on the fact
only events of that kind have that auditory appearance. In the
right circumstances we can tell, by hearing the sound it makes,
that a Zippo cigarette lighter has been opened and struck. Zippo
lighters are designed in such a way that they produce a distinctive
and characteristic sound, a sound that can easily be distinguished
from the sound made by other kinds of event. It is possible to
learn, as many of us doubtless have learned, to recognise that
sound and so to tell – on the basis of its auditory appearance−that
a certain kind of event – a Zippo-lighter event – has occurred.
Suppose that there is another kind of event that produces
sounds just like Zippo-lighter events such that we cannot tell them
apart. It is not hard to imagine: we might suppose that a compet-
ing manufacturer decides to produce cheap off-brand lighters
that look and sound like genuine Zippo lighters. They do their job
well, and the sounds produced by the opening and striking of
these off-brand lighters are just like the sounds made by genuine
Zippo lighters: off-brand-lighter events have the same auditory
appearance as Zippo-lighter events. If these off-brand events were
present in our environment then it would not be possible to tell,
on the basis of its auditory appearance, that a Zippo-lighter event
had occurred, rather than that an event that was either a Zippo- or
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an off-brand-lighter event had occurred. The presence in our
environment of off-brand-lighter events would – in the absence of
further collateral or contextual information – undermine our
capacity to recognise Zippo-lighter events. So our capacity to rec-
ognise Zippo-lighter events on the basis of their auditory appear-
ance depends on there not being other kinds of events in our
environment that have the same auditory appearance as Zippo-
lighter events.
The relation between Zippo-lighter events and their auditory
appearance is clearly contingent. The possibility of off-brand light-
ers events shows that there is no essential connection between the
property of being a Zippo-lighter event and the property of having
the auditory appearance of a Zippo-lighter event (of sounding like
a Zippo-lighter event). But that is hardly surprising. For some-
thing to be a Zippo-lighter event it must involve a cigarette lighter
manufactured by a particular company (the Zippo Manufacturing
Company of Bradford, Pennsylvania), and the relational property
of having been manufactured by a particular company can have
no direct influence on the sounds that something makes – and so
on its auditory appearance. Any lighter that is intrinsically the
same as a Zippo lighter – constructed in the same way from the
same materials – will produce sounds that are the same as those
produced by a Zippo lighter; and clearly lighters that are intrin-
sically the same as Zippo lighters, such as the off-brand lighter,
may lack the relational property of being manufactured by the
Zippo Manufacturing Company.
The argument does not undermine the idea that in certain
circumstances we can recognise Zippo-lighter events on the basis
of their auditory appearance, so it leaves intact the idea that we
can hear things on the basis of hearing the sounds they make. But
it shows that doing so requires that we be suitably sensitive to the
holding or otherwise, on any particular occasion we exercise our
recognitional capacity, of various background conditions; in par-
ticular, it requires that we be sensitive to the likely occurrence of
an off-brand-lighter event. We cannot know that those back-
ground conditions hold on the basis of auditory experience, so
our knowledge that some event is a Zippo-lighter event, even
when acquired on the basis of a capacity to recognise the sounds
Zippo lighters make, is not acquired solely on the basis of audition
– it is not purely auditory knowledge.
If the argument generalises, then – because all such knowledge
would depend on the holding of background conditions whose
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obtaining could not be known on the basis of auditory experience
– it would undermine the idea that we have any purely auditory
knowledge of sound producing events. To show that there can be
purely auditory knowledge of sound producing events we need to
show that there are some kinds of event which meet the condition
that there are no events of a different kind with the same auditory
appearance.
There is an obvious reason for doubting that the argument
generalises. Being a Zippo-lighter event is not an intrinsic prop-
erty of an event and just as we would not expect non-intrinsic
properties to determine the visual appearance of an object, so we
would not expect non-intrinsic properties to determine the audi-
tory appearance of an event. But that gives us no reason to doubt
that there are intrinsic properties of events that do determine
their auditory appearance.
Whether there are such properties might seem to turn on our
view of the nature of sounds and their acoustic properties. I
suggested that how things appear to us in auditory experience is
determined by how sounds appear to us, and that the way sounds
appear is determined by the acoustic properties they instantiate. It
is sometimes supposed that acoustic properties are merely subjec-
tive sensory qualities. Hume, for example, thought that ‘Sounds,
colours, heat and cold, according to modern philosophy are not
qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind’.2 According to
this line of thought, acoustic properties are sensory qualities that
are not to be identified with any properties of material objects or
events. Our experiences of sounds having such sensory qualities
might be caused by physical or material events of certain kinds,
and the causal connection might be sufficiently reliable that we
could come to recognise (given knowledge of the background
conditions) those kinds of events on the basis of the experiences,
but there is no essential connection between the sensory qualities
of the sounds we experience and the material causes of our
experiences of them. The very same qualities could have been
instantiated by sounds with a different material cause. Given that
the very same qualities could have been instantiated by sounds
with a different material cause, there are no properties of sound-
producing events that escape the Zippo argument. So if acoustic
properties are subjective sensory qualities, our capacities to
2 David Hume, Treatise of Human Nature. Selby-Bigge, ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1911), Bk III, part I, Sect. 1, p. 177; and Bk I, IV, IV.
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recognise sound producing events will always depend on the
holding of background conditions that connect sounds with
certain kinds of sensory qualities with material events of certain
kinds and we can have no purely auditory knowledge of sound-
producing events.
Subjectivism about acoustic properties is implausible, however,
and the arguments in favour of subjectivism are not widely
accepted. It is more plausible to think that acoustic properties are
identical to physical properties of material objects,3 in particular
to the vibrations of objects. According to this view, certain physical
properties have a distinctive auditory appearance and acoustic
properties just are physical properties picked out in terms of their
auditory appearance. If that is right then it is not, as the subjec-
tivist would claim, that vibratory events cause experiences of
sounds with certain sensory qualities; those sensory qualities are
the appearance in auditory experience of certain kinds of physical
vibratory events. It follows that if two events have the same audi-
tory appearance then they must have physical properties in
common too – namely, the physical properties that determine the
acoustic properties of sounds.
If physicalism about acoustic properties is true then there are
properties of events that are not subject to the Zippo argument. A
sound with a particular appearance, that is a sound that instanti-
ates particular acoustic properties, could only be the appearance
of a vibratory event with certain physical properties, and two
vibratory events of the same physical kind would have the same
auditory appearance. Our capacity to recognise these kinds of
event on the basis of their auditory appearance does not depend
on the holding of background conditions, so we can have purely
auditory knowledge of them.
If this line of reasoning is correct then auditory perception
enables a kind of cognitive contact with the world. But it falls short
of what we might have hoped for. If our purely auditory capacities
for recognising kinds of event are limited to vibratory events then
our purely auditory knowledge is correspondingly limited. What
we wanted was an account of our capacities to recognise the kinds
of ordinary sound-producing events that I began by describing.
Those events – striking a match, winding a clock, and so on – cause
3 If acoustic properties supervene on physical properties rather than being identical to
them, then the argument that follows would need to be amended. Such an amendment
would make no difference to the conclusion: the kind of cognitive contact enabled by
supervenience would be no different to that enabled by identity.
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vibratory events (or perhaps have vibratory events as parts), but
are not themselves vibratory events.4 So physicalism about acoustic
properties is not itself sufficient to show that our purely auditory
capacities for recognising events extend to the ordinary kinds of
sound-producing events that I began by describing.
Is it the case that our purely auditory recognition capacities for
kinds of event are limited to vibratory events? Suppose there is no
essential connection between properties of vibratory events and
other intrinsic properties of objects and events. Then even if
auditory appearances are the appearances of vibratory events, the
connection between the appearances of those events and any
other – non-acoustic, non-vibratory – properties of a material
objects and events is contingent in the way required for the Zippo
argument. Therefore, we can have no purely auditory knowledge
of any non-acoustic, non-vibratory feature of a material object or
event.
According to the subjectivist, acoustic properties are subjective
sensory qualities and therefore our capacities to recognise ordi-
nary sound-producing events will always depend on the holding of
background conditions. If we reject subjectivism and hold instead
that acoustic properties are identical to physical properties of
events, then we can have purely auditory knowledge of physical
events. But if our purely auditory knowledge of physical events is
restricted to vibratory events, then our capacities to recognise
ordinary sound-producing events will also always depend on the
holding of background conditions. In moving from subjectivism
to physicalism we have simply shifted the problem. The problem
for the subjectivist is to explain how hearing sounds – conceived as
subjective – can put us in a position to hear ordinary sound-
producing events; the problem for the physicalist is to explain
how hearing sounds – conceived as certain kinds of vibratory
event – can put us in a position to hear ordinary sound-producing
events.
This argument depends on the supposition that there is no
essential connection between properties of vibratory events and
other intrinsic properties of objects and events. There are reasons
for rejecting that supposition. The way an object vibrates is deter-
mined by its material constitution together with the nature of the
event that caused it to vibrate. Given that, a certain kind of
4 For more on the relation between sound-producing events, vibratory events, and
sounds, see M. Nudds, ‘Auditory Perception’, in Matthen, ed., Oxford Handbook of the
Philosophy of Perception (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015).
468 MATTHEW NUDDS
© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
vibratory event could only be produced when an object with a
certain shape, size, and material composition is struck in a certain
way – that is, by a certain kind of sound-producing event. There-
fore that auditory appearance – that vibratory event – could not be
the appearance of a different kind of sound-producing event. The
same kind of vibratory event could not be produced by an object
of a different size, shape or material composition, or by an
object stuck in a different way. If that is right, then there will be a
range of non-acoustic properties of ordinary sound-producing
events that escape the Zippo argument. It would follow that we
can have purely auditory knowledge of this kind of event, namely
an event involving an object with a certain shape, size, and
material composition, and struck in a certain way.
Therefore, if we both accept that sounds can be identified with
vibratory events and that the character of these vibratory events is
determined by the material constitution of the vibrating object
together with the nature of the event that causes it to vibrate, then
it is possible for us to acquire purely auditory knowledge of at least
some ordinary sound-producing events.
There are at least two reasons for doubting that conclusion.
The first is that we might doubt whether the properties of material
objects and events that determine vibratory events, and so which
we could come to know on a purely auditory basis, are properties
that are constitutive of ordinary sound-producing events. If they
are not, our purely auditory knowledge would still fall short of
what we were trying to explain. The second is that it is possible to
produce a vibratory event using a loudspeaker that is of the same
kind – with the same auditory appearance – as any vibratory event
produced by an ordinary sound-producing event. Therefore,
there is reason to doubt that there is any essential connection
between properties of vibratory events and other intrinsic prop-
erties of objects and events, and so to doubt that there can be any
purely auditory knowledge of ordinary sound-producing events. I
think there are ways to address both these doubts, but rather than
do that here, I am simply going to assume that they can be
addressed and to turn instead to a different problem: even if we
can have purely auditory knowledge of sound-producing events,
auditory appearances fail to enable the kind of cognitive contact
with the world enabled by vision and touch. The problem turns on
the nature of auditory appearances.
Our ordinary conception of the world is a conception of it as
containing material objects of various kinds (books, tables, chairs,
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cutlery, cats, and cars). To think of these objects as material is to
think of them as having those properties we take to be constitutive
of material objects. Such properties include position, shape, size,
motion, and properties definable when these properties are com-
bined with the idea of force – mass, weight, hardness, etc. Our
understanding of these properties involves a theory: ‘[t]o grasp
theseproperties onemustmaster a set of interconnectedprinciples
that make up an elementary theory – of primitive mechanics –
into which these properties fit’.5 In virtue of our grasp of such a
theory we understand how an object’s properties determine its
causal powers, its behaviour, how it interacts with other objects, and
the implications of these interactions for how it changes over time.
So to think of an object as an element of the material world is to
think of it as having the properties described by the primitive
theory of mechanics, and so as falling under the interconnected
principles that make up that theory.
Visual perception (and touch)6 gives us access to the material
world conceived in this way. It does so because the visual appear-
ances of objects are sufficient to fix them as elements of the
material world: coming to know the visual appearance of some-
thing is coming to know how it fits into the material world as
ordinarily conceived. There are two components to this idea. The
first is that there is a connection between an object’s appearing a
certain way and being that way. There is a range of properties
which are such that (in normal circumstances) if an object
appears to have one of those properties then it does have that
property. For example, if something has the appearance of a cube
then it has the property of being cubic.7 These properties include
properties that we take to be constitutive of the idea of a material
object. That means that visual appearances can ground purely
visual knowledge of a range of properties of objects that we take to
be constitutive of material objects.
The second is that (some of) the properties that constitute an
object’s appearance are properties in virtue of which it falls under
the interconnected principles that make up the elementary
theory. Having that appearance is sufficient for the object to be an
5 Gareth Evans, ‘Things Without the Mind’. In Evans, Collected Papers. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1985: 249–290) p. 269.
6 In what follows I only discuss vision, but what I say applies to touch too.
7 For a discussion and defense of the existence of such properties see M.G. F. Martin,
‘What’s in a Look’. In B. Nanay, ed., Perceiving the World. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2010: 160–225); for a different approach see C.A.B. Peacocke, Sense and Content. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1983), ch. 3.
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element of the material world because the properties that consti-
tute its appearance are those in virtue of which it is an element of
the material world. When an object appears cubic, the property
that it appears to have – being cubic – is a property in virtue of
which it is an element of the material world. This connection
between the properties objects appear to have in visual experi-
ence and the properties that we take to be constitutive of material
objects is, I suggest, central to our conception of visual perception
as enabling cognitive contact with the material world. We do not
take the objects of visual awareness to indicate how the world is, or
as grounds from which we can infer how the world is: as a conse-
quence of how they appear, we take the objects of visual awareness
themselves to be elements of the world. It is in virtue of that fact
that we take our visual experience to constitute knowledge that
the objects of experience are elements of the material world.
Prima facie, auditory experience is not like this. There is a
connection between things appearing a certain way in auditory
experience and the occurrence of events of certain kinds – events
involving ordinary material objects – in virtue of which we can
recognise events on the basis of the way they appear in auditory
experience. But the properties that constitute an event’s auditory
appearance – the acoustic properties of sounds – are not proper-
ties in virtue of which it falls under the interconnected principles
that make up our elementary theory of the material world. Having
that appearance is not sufficient for the object to be an element of
the material world because the properties that constitute its appear-
ance are those in virtue of which it is an element of the material
world. That marks a significant contrast with the visual case.
Instead, the connection between the properties that constitute
an event’s appearance and other properties of the event is suffi-
cient for us to come to know – in virtue of the exercise of a
recognitional capacity – that it has those properties. The proper-
ties that we come to know include those in virtue of which it falls
under the interconnected principles that make up our elementary
theory. So, we might say, auditory experience is sufficient for us to
know that something is an element of the material world, but
auditory experience does not itself constitute that knowledge. We
do not take the objects of auditory experience, in virtue of how
they appear, themselves to be elements of the material world.
It makes no difference to this line of argument to think that
acoustic properties are physical properties, and hence that audi-
tory appearances are the appearances of certain kinds of vibratory
AUDITORY APPEARANCES 471
© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
events. Vibratory events are not events that consist in the interac-
tions of (or changes to) objects as ordinarily conceived, they are
the causal consequences of those interactions and changes. When
two objects collide, for example, the collision causes a vibratory
event; it is that event and not the collision which, according to this
view, appears to us in auditory experience.
Vibratory events and their properties do not figure in our ordi-
nary understanding of the material world. It is not part of our
understanding of shape, mass, and force that objects with these
properties will vibrate in a certain way as a consequence of their
interactions, and our grasp of the elementary theory does not
relate the properties that we take to be constitutive of material
objects to the kind of vibratory events that appear in auditory
experience.8 So the appearance of a vibratory event in
auditory experience does not constitute knowledge of that event
as part of the material world, and our understanding of the rela-
tion between the vibratory events that appear in auditory experi-
ence and material objects and events as we ordinarily conceive
them is left open by how they appear in our auditory experience.
Even if we accept that auditory appearances are the appear-
ances of certain kinds of vibratory events, the connection between
those vibratory events and objects, events, and their features as we
ordinarily understand them is not apparent in experience. It
seems, then, that there is a significant contrast between visual and
auditory perception. Whereas in the visual case, the objects of
visual experience appear as elements of the material world, in the
auditory case the objects of auditory experience do not appear as
elements of the material world. The connection between the
objects of auditory experience and material objects and events is
not itself apparent in auditory experience.
I began with a list of different kinds of event that we can
recognise on the basis of the sounds they make. When we recog-
nise an event, we categorise it as an event of a certain kind. How
do we do this?
One plausible answer views our capacity to recognise ordinary
sound-producing events as having a kind of compositional
8 I believe it is possible to defend this claim on a priori grounds (see Evans, ‘Things
Without the Mind’). Our ordinary understanding of objects and their interactions has
also been studied empirically. For a survey of some of this work, see E. Spelke and
G. Van de Walle, ‘Perceiving and reasoning about objects: Insights from infants’. In
N. Eilan, R. McCarthy, & W. Brewer, eds., Spatial representation. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell
1993: 132–162).
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structure: we are able to recognise a number of different basic
events; ordinary sound-producing events are structured sequences
of these basic events; so we are able to recognise ordinary sound-
producing events on the basis of recognising the pattern of basic
events that makes them up.
In support of this answer is the thought that it is possible to
categorise sounds according to the kinds of basic event that
produce them. Gaver suggests that an initial categorisation might
begin by distinguishing sounds produced by solid objects, liquids,
and gasses.9 We can further distinguish the different ways a solid
object can produce a sound: by impact (discrete, relatively short
inputs of energy), by scraping (continuous inputs of energy), by
rolling movements, and by deformation (crushing or crumpling);
and we can go on to make further distinctions amongst each of
these different kinds of event. For example, the texture, material,
speed, acceleration or force of a scraping may affect the sound
produced, so we might distinguish correspondingly different
kinds of scraping event. Differences in physical or material prop-
erties may affect the sounds produced by the other kinds of event,
and so we might distinguish them accordingly. In this way we end
up with categories that correspond to a range of different kinds of
basic event that produce sounds. Since this process of categorisa-
tion distinguishes basic events on the basis of differences between
the sounds they make, it is plausible to suppose that we could
come to recognise kinds of basic event on the basis of the sounds
that they produce.
Many of the ordinary events that we recognise are complex,
made up of sequences of basic events. We can recognise these
complex events on the basis of the pattern of simple basic events
that make them up. For example, a match being struck involves
the striking sound of the match and then the flaring sound of its
lighting; a door being shut makes a scraping sound followed by
the sound of an impact.10 If we are able to recognise the basic
events that make up complex events, then we can recognise
complex events by drawing on our knowledge of how they are
structured out of basic events. If our capacity to recognise ordi-
nary events is compositional in this way, then it can be explained
9 See W. Gaver, ‘How do we hear in the world? Explorations in ecological acoustics.’
Ecological Psychology 1993, 5: 285–313.
10 See W. Gaver, ‘What in the world do we hear? An ecological approach to auditory
source perception’. Ecological Psychology 1993, 5: 1–29.
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in terms of capacities to recognise (perhaps a limited number of)
basic events.
How do we come to recognise basic events? One way to think of
basic event recognition is by analogy with object recognition. We
recognise an object as an object of a certain kind by perceiving it
to have the features characteristic of that kind of object. So, by
analogy, we recognise a basic event as an event of a certain kind
by perceiving it to have the features characteristic of that kind of
event. These features might be the features that determine it as an
event of that kind. For example, we might perceive an object and
perceive the way that the object is changing and, in virtue of that,
recognise that an event of a certain kind is occurring: we recog-
nise a person’s walking because we perceive the person and the
way they move. Walking is an event that involves a person moving
in just that way, so we are able to recognise that the person is
walking on the basis of seeing them moving that way.
An alternative way to think of basic event recognition rejects
the idea that we do so by perceiving the features characteristic of
the event, and appeals instead to the idea that can we recognise
an event by perceiving some distinctive cue or cues to its occur-
rence. Sounds produced by different basic events have distinc-
tively different acoustic properties. Given this, it is plausible that
we could recognise a basic event on the basis of hearing the
sound that it makes without perceiving features of the event: the
distinctive acoustic properties of the sound can instead function
as a cue to the kind of basic event that produced it. The cue may
be simple – it may amount to a single property that in the
context reliably indicates the kind of event in question. Having
the property that constitutes the cue need not be characteristic
of the kind of event in question and in the auditory case, per-
ceiving the cue does not constitute perceiving some feature of
the basic event.
The compositional account of auditory event recognition and
categorisation sketched above is consistent with the idea that we
recognise basic events by perceiving an auditory cue to their
occurrence. Whilst it is true that we perceive complex events by
perceiving their characteristic structure – the way in which they
are made up of simpler events – the account does not require that
we perceive the characteristic properties of the basic sound pro-
ducing events that determine them as the kind of events that they
are. It merely requires that we are able to recognise and categorise
these basic events. We could do that on the basis of perceiving
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some relatively simple auditory cue to their occurrence. So the
compositional account together with a cue-based account of
our capacities to recognise basic events might seem to offer the
best explanation of our abilities to recognise ordinary sound-
producing events.
According to this picture, we recognise sound-producing events
on the basis of perceiving the sounds that they make, but proper-
ties of those sound producing events do not appear to us in
auditory experience. We perceive sounds and their acoustic fea-
tures, and on that basis are in a position to know that certain basic
events are occurring, but we do not perceive the properties of the
basic events themselves. If this account is the whole story, then
auditory perception contrasts with visual perception and touch in
the way I described above: auditory appearances are not the
appearances of elements of the material world.
The compositional and cue-based account offers a plausible
account of at least some instances of our capacity to recognise
sound-producing events. Is it true of all cases? In what follows, I
draw a comparison between the auditory and visual perception of
movements in an attempt to show that it is not.
In vision we can discriminate movements that differ in their
dynamic properties. When someone picks up an object we can see
from the way they move how heavy it is. Their movement when
they pick up a heavy object is different to their movement when
they pick up a light object. This is often jarringly apparent in films
when the protagonist’s supposedly heavy suitcase is lifted and is
quite obviously empty; or when a ‘heavy’ rock is lifted off the
ground and it is immediately apparent that the rock is a painted
block of polystyrene. The difference in the movements is due to a
difference in the forces acting on the body of the person lifting
the weight resulting in visible differences in the dynamic proper-
ties of their movement – in particular the acceleration of the
movement. These dynamic properties are visible in the case of
non-biological movements too. When one rolling ball strikes
another and causes it to move, it is possible to perceive the relative
masses of the two balls. Their masses determine the acceleration
of their subsequent movements and differences are visible.
Our ability to discriminate the dynamics of movements has
been investigated experimentally. In one experiment, observers
were able to ‘distinguish the inanimate motion of a falling and
bouncing object from the animate motions produced when the
same object is moved by hand along the same path, to the same
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endpoints, and at the same frequency’ or velocity.11 Again, the
difference between the movements of the two objects is a differ-
ence in their dynamic properties, in particular in the way their
velocity changes. The dynamic properties of the animate motion
reflect an input of energy, whereas those of the inanimate move-
ment reflect dissipation of energy. These differences in the
dynamics of the movements are visible to the observer and the
differences in the forces acting on the objects are visible in the way
they move.
We can conceive of the motion of an object as consisting in its
occupying a series of different locations at different times (i.e. in
the succession, over an ordered series of times and locations, of
the instantaneous states of an object at each location and time).
Given this conception of motion, we might suppose that the
capacity to see an object move consists in the capacity to see a
sequence of states of an object. We can think of this as a reductive
account. The perception of movement is explained simply in
terms of the perception of an object over time, and does not
involve anything over and above the capacity to see, from one
moment to the next, where an object is. On this account, to
discriminate between the different movements of an object would
require us to judge differences in the time taken by an object to
occupy a series of locations and on that basis to judge differences
in the dynamic properties of the object’s movement.
This reductive explanation is implausible. To tell which of two
objects has the greater mass on the basis of the timing of their
occupation of a series of locations would require the application of
quantitative physical principles. It is implausible to think that we
apply suchprinciples indiscriminatingmovements: bothbecause it
is doubtful that we can perceive the timing of the series in the
precise way required to apply the principles, and because we lack
the capacity to perform the computations required by them.
A better explanation of our capacity to discriminate these differ-
ent movements is that we have a dedicated visual capacity for the
perception of movements (and perhaps other kinds of events).
That is, our visual system is able to recover information sufficient to
work out – via the operation of a computational process – the
dynamics of an object’s movement from visually detected motion,
and so produce a representation of the movement and its dynamic
11 G. Bingham, ‘Dynamics and the Problem of Visual Event Recognition.’ In T.R. Port
and T. van Gelder, eds., Mind as Motion: Dynamics, behaviour, and cognition. (Cambridge,
MA.: MIT Press 1995. 403–448), p. 409.
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properties. To suppose this is to suppose that movement events are
represented as such by the visual system inmuch the same way that
objects are represented as such, and hence that movement events
are among the ‘objects’ of visual experience.
Further support for this suggestion comes from the fact that in
some cases we see an object as a consequence of seeing move-
ment, not the other way around. This is clearly demonstrated in
‘patch light’ displays. In these displays, lights are attached to
points on the surface of an object, and the object is viewed in such
a way that only the patches of light are visible. When stationary,
the pattern of light is unrecognisable – a meaningless pattern of
spots – but when the lights move, the object is immediately appar-
ent. Perhaps the best known example of this kind of display is
Gunnar Johansson’s films of a person walking.12 Johansson filmed
people in such a way that only the lights attached to their joints
were visible. When static, the lights have no apparent connection
to one another, but once the lights begin to move, we immediately
see a walking person. The effect is striking and involuntary – the
structure revealed by the moving lights pops out as a kind of
moving gestalt. This phenomenon occurs in patch light displays of
many kinds of event including rolling balls, ripples on water, and
swinging pendulums13. These examples illustrate the perception
of structure from motion. They show that the visual system is
able to extract information about the structure of an object by
interpreting local patterns of motion on the retina as the move-
ment of that object. In these cases, the representation of the
object is not independent of the representation of the movement
of the object, and that undermines the idea that the capacity to
see an object move consists in the capacity to see a sequence of
states of an object.14
We experience movements as having a distinctive visual appear-
ance. When we see someone lifting a supposedly heavy weight
too easily the movement literally looks wrong – it has a visual
12 See G. Johansson, ‘Visual perception of biological motion and a model for its analy-
sis.’ Perception and Psychophysics. 14, 1973: 201–211.
13 See G. Bingham, R. Schmidt, and L. Rosenblum, ‘Dynamics and the Orientation of
Kinematic Forms in Visual Event Recognition’. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human
Perception and Performance. 1995, 21, 6: 1473–1493.
14 For a recent discussion that presents evidence in favour of the same conclusion about
the perception of intentional movement see B. Scholl and T. Gao, ‘Perceiving Animacy and
Intentionality: Visual Processing or Higher-Level Judgement?’ In M. Rutherford and A.
Kuhlmeier, eds., Social Perception: Detection and Interpretation of Animacy, Agency, and Intention.
(Cambridge, MA. MIT Press, 2013: 197–230).
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appearance that is inconsistent with the movement of a heavy
object. When we see the movement of an object falling under
gravity the movement has a distinctive appearance, and it looks
different to that of an object moved by hand. This lends support
to the suggestion that the visual system represents movements and
their properties: the computational process that produces such
representations results in, and explains, a visual experience of
movements that have a distinctive appearance (in much the same
way that the visual system performs complex calculations to deter-
mine the reflectance of an illuminated surface, which results in an
experience of a surface that has a distinctive appearance).
It is the distinctive visual appearance of different movements
that enables us to discriminate between movements that differ in
their dynamic properties, and on the basis of which we can per-
ceive properties of the things that move and the different forces
that resulted in the movement. In discriminating between differ-
ent movements we are discriminating between events that have
distinctive visual appearances.15
So we can perceive movements and their properties, and move-
ments have a distinctive visual appearance that cannot be reduced
to the static appearance of objects and their locations over time.
Suppose that something similar is true of auditory perception:
that there is a perceptual process, analogous to that in vision,
which functions to represent certain kinds of events that produce
sounds we hear.
In this final section of the paper, I will suggest that two claims
are plausible. First, that there is information about movement in
the structure of the sounds produced by (some) movements that
the auditory system can and does extract as part of a process that
functions to produce representations of the movements that pro-
duced the sounds. Second, that movements have a distinctive
auditory appearance, grounded in the temporal structure of
sounds, in such a way that we can think of the appearance of a
movement event in auditory experience as the appearance of an
element of the material world as ordinarily conceived.
The sound made by a rolling ball – for example, a marble
rolling across the desk – is distinctive and is easily recognisable;
the rolling of a ball is a good candidate for being a basic event.
There is empirical evidence that, in addition to being able to
15 For a survey see G. Bingham, R. Schmidt, and L. Rosenblum, ‘Dynamics and the
Orientation of Kinematic Forms in Visual Event Recognition’.
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recognise the rolling of a ball, we can tell the speed at which it is
rolling, and the relative size of the ball.16 It is also possible to tell
when the ball changes speed: whether it is speeding up or slowing
down, for example. This experimental evidence confirms some-
thing that I think is fairly familiar. It is easy to imagine the sound
made by a marble dropped into a large metal dish and allowed to
roll back and forth until it settles, and to imagine how you could
tell what was happening to the ball: to tell when the ball was
rolling up the side of the dish and when down, to tell when it had
reached the apex of its movement, and to tell when it was at the
lowest point of its movement. As far as I know the question of
whether it is possible to perceive the differences in the way a ball
is caused to move (for example, to tell the difference between a
ball that rolls under the influence of gravity and one that is caused
to move by begin struck) has not been tested, but I think it is
possible that this difference is also perceivable.
How should we explain our capacity to recognise these features
of a rolling event? We might do so by appeal to the kind of
cue-based account I described above. The rolling of a ball pro-
duces sounds with a distinctive appearance on the basis of which
we could recognise the kind of movement that produced the
sound. Furthermore, the sound produced by a rolling ball that
speeds up has a different appearance to that produced by a rolling
ball that slows down; the sound produced by a ball that is rolling
fast has a different appearance to that produced by a ball that is
rolling slowly; and so on. So it is reasonable to think that we could
come to recognise these different events by learning to discrimi-
nate between the different sounds.
But I think that there is an alternative: that what is true of visual
perception is true of auditory perception. Just as we have a visual
capacity for movement perception, so we have an auditory capac-
ity for the perception of certain kinds of events.
To defend this alternative we need to show that the auditory
system could function in such a way as to produce representations
of the rolling of a ball. In favour of this possibility is the fact that
there is information available in the pattern of frequency compo-
nents of the sound produced by the rolling that would be suffi-
cient for the auditory system to work out that a rolling event is
16 See M. Houben, A. Kohlrausch, and D. Hermes, ‘Auditory cues determining the
perception of the size and speed of rolling balls’. Proceedings of the 2001 international
conference on auditory displays, Espoo, Finland. Espoo, Finland: Conference organization,
2001: 105–110.
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occurring. This information is embodied in the temporal struc-
ture of the sound, in particular in the sound’s periodic properties.
The sound of rolling is periodic because the rotation of the ball is
periodic, and any small perturbation in the sphericity of the ball
will modulate the sound it produces in a periodic way. This perio-
dicity, and changes to it, carries information that specifies the
occurrence of a rolling event. On a much smaller scale, the
surface of the ball and that of the surface on which it rolls are not
perfectly smooth. We can picture both at a microscopic level as
being sawtoothed. As the ball rolls over the surface, these teeth
strike together in a sequence of tiny impacts. The pattern of
impacts is characteristic of a rolling object, and carries informa-
tion about the speed of the rotation, as well as other properties of
the ball including its material composition and its mass. They
produce a vibration that is detected by the auditory system. Given
this, I think it is not implausible that the auditory system could
extract information from the pattern of frequency components
produced by the rolling ball sufficient to produce a representa-
tion of a rolling event, and to represent that rolling event as
having a range of properties.
Such an auditory capacity for perception of the movement
would not depend on the perception of change in the spatial
location of the moving object. It may be that we hear a rolling ball
move from left to right in front of us, and so perceive the change
in spatial location of the ball as it rolls. But perceiving the change
in location is not perceiving the rolling. A rolling movement often
involves a change in location, but need not do so (I have in mind,
for example, the kind of ball bearing that rolls but is held fixed in
position): they are distinct kinds of event.
Just as in the visual case there is a distinctive way movements
appear, so I think we can make sense of the idea that in the
auditory case there is a distinctive way rolling movements appear:
that in hearing the rolling sound, the event – the rolling – is
apparent to us. In the visual case, movements have an appearance
that cannot be reduced to something more basic. When we see
movements, there are high-level properties of the movements,
represented as a result of a visual capacity for the perception of
such properties, that are visually apparent to us. In the auditory
case, movements – in particular rolling movements – have an
appearance that cannot be reduced to something more basic.
When we hear rolling movements, there are high-level properties
of the movements that are apparent to us in auditory experience.
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These properties are represented as a result of an auditory capac-
ity for the perception of such properties on the basis of informa-
tion extracted from the temporal properties of sounds.
If two different rolling movements appear differently in audi-
tory experience, what does this difference consist in? There are
high-level properties of the movements that are apparent to us
and in virtue of which the movements appear different. These
differences in high-level properties are grounded in differences in
the temporal properties of the rolling movements. The temporal
properties of the rolling movements are the same as the temporal
properties of the sounds produced by the rolling movements.
Both the event and the sound have the same temporal properties
across a range of scales, from properties determined by the inter-
action of the surface of the ball and the surface on which it rolls,
and the periodic properties that are consequences of rotation, to
the time taken for the rolling movement to be completed. That
means that the appearance of the temporal properties of the
sound is itself the appearance of the temporal properties of the
rolling movement. Rolling movements are apparent in auditory
experience because the temporal properties of the sounds they
produce are apparent in auditory experience, and the appearance
of those properties is the appearance of temporal properties of
the movement. Different high-level properties of the movements
are grounded in these different temporal properties. In an analo-
gous way, two faces can appear visually different, and the differ-
ence between them consists in differences in the spatial
arrangement of their parts. But they do not appear different
simply in that they appear different in their spatial properties;
they appear different in some higher-level properties that are
grounded in their spatial properties.
The properties of rolling movements can be apparent in audi-
tory experience because they are higher-level properties of move-
ments grounded in temporal properties that are apparent in
auditory experience.
If what I am suggesting is right, we do not simply perceive a cue
to the kind of event that produces the sound; in the case of rolling
movements at least, we are able to perceive properties of the
events themselves, and we are able to recognise what kinds of
events they are on the basis of how those events appear in auditory
experience.
My aim has not been to offer a demonstrative account in favour
of this suggestion, but to provide an alternative to the cue-based
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account. I have only offered the barest sketch of what this alter-
native might look like, and much more needs to be done to show
that it provides a better explanation than the cue-based account.
However, if that can be done, the account provides a way to
respond to the second problem that I outlined above – that the
apparent properties of the objects of auditory experience are not
those in virtue of which they are elements of the material world. It
does so because the temporal features and the high-level proper-
ties that constitute the auditory appearance of movement are
plausibly features that figure in our ordinary conception of the
material world.
The elementary theory that grounds our understanding of the
properties constitutive of material objects includes principles that
relate the material properties of objects to the ways objects inter-
act. Principles that describe, for example, how an object’s shape
determines how the object will affect and be affected by other
objects, and principles that describe the consequences of mass for
the way an object moves and interacts with other objects. The
elementary theory includes principles governing the dynamic
behaviour of objects and underpins our understanding, for
example, of what it is for a ball to roll, and of what the conse-
quences are of one ball striking another. The appearance of a
rolling movement is the appearance of an event that, in virtue of
being the way it appears, is governed by the principles of the
elementary theory. So in having that appearance it appears as an
element of the material world.
My focus has been on rolling movements. If the general
approach that I have sketched is along the right lines, then it
ought to be possible to extend the approach to show that prop-
erties of a range of different kinds of sound-producing events are
apparent in experience. That would show that, although not all
sounds present the appearance of sound-producing events, those
that do ground the same kind of cognitive contact with elements
of the material world as vision (and touch) do, and therefore that
our auditory access to the world goes beyond cue based recogni-
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